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EU and UK Wire Transfer Regulations—timeline to 31 December 2023 [Archived]

EU and UK Wire Transfer Regulations—timeline to 31 December 2023 [Archived] ARCHIVED: This Practice Note is archived and is no longer maintained. For UK developments see: AML/CTF/CPF—timeline of UK legal and regulatory developments for financial services. For EU developments see: AML/CTF/CPF—timeline of EU legal and regulatory developments for financial services. This timeline outlines the developments in relation to the Wire Transfer Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/847) (also known as the Funds Transfer Regulation (FTR)), its predecessor the Wire Transfer Regulation (Regulation (EU) 1781/2006) and the Recast EU WTR2 (also referred to as the Recast EU Transfer of Funds Regulation (EU FTR2)) which entered into force in June 2023 and applies from 30 December 2024 and forms part of the wider European Commission 2021 legislative package overhauling the European Union’s AML/CTF legal framework and regulatory requirements. It further includes the onshoring of EU WTR2 through the Retained Regulation (EU) 2015/847 (UK WTR2) and relevant updates brought in through the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017,...

Debt relief orders (DROs)—checklist

Debt relief orders (DROs)—checklist Debt relief orders Debt relief orders (DROs) are an alternative to bankruptcy and are dealt with in sections 251A–251X and Schedule 4ZA to the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), and supplemented by the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (IR 2016), SI 2016/1024, Pt 9. They provide protection from debts by prohibiting further legal process against the debtor without the court's permission and, after a year, discharges the debtor from those debts. The big difference between a DRO and bankruptcy is that DROs are available only to debtors with no substantial assets and no income over and above what is necessary for the debtor's 'reasonable needs', and there are no provisions for the collection, realisation and distribution of the debtor's estate on the basis there will be nothing to distribute. As set out in R (on the application of Payne) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, DROs are a 'a new and simplified way of wiping the slate clean for debtors who are...

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Mandatory Disclosure Rules (MDR)—When an intermediary must report to HMRC—Flowchart

Mandatory Disclosure Rules (MDR)—When an intermediary must report to HMRC—Flowchart The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published the model Mandatory Disclosure Rules (MDR) for Common Reporting Standard (CRS) Avoidance Arrangements and Offshore Structures in March 2018, aiming to promote country by country consistency in the application of disclosure and transparency to tackle aggressive tax planning at a global level. The model MDR are defined as ‘the model rules’ in The International Tax Enforcement (Disclosable Arrangements) Regulations 2023, SI 2023/38 (MDR regulations), by which the MDR are implemented in the UK. Drawing closely on the model rules, the MDR regulations require promoters, service providers and taxpayers to send information to HMRC about reportable

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Money Laundering Regulations 2017—CDD quick reference guide—individuals

Money Laundering Regulations 2017—CDD quick reference guide—individuals Client due diligence (CDD) is a central pillar of the anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) regime. CDD requirements underpin the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLR 2017), SI 2017/692, as amended. Counter-proliferation financing is the most recent addition to the long-established AML and CTF regime. Requirements in relation to counter-proliferation financing were introduced through amendments to the MLR 2017 and include in relation to systems and controls, risk assessment, etc. No specific counter-proliferation financing requirements were added in relation to CDD, and existing CDD provisions in the MLR 2017 were not amended to include mention of proliferation financing. As things stand, therefore, counter-proliferation financing is not covered in this Practice Note. For more information, see Practice Note: Counter-proliferation financing—CPF—the basics. Where the MLR 2017 apply (see Practice Notes: Money Laundering Regulations 2017—scope and application—law firms), conducting CDD is an absolute requirement. It is not in itself subject to the risk-based approach....

Complaints—SRA 2011 regime and SRA 2019 regime compared [Archived]

Complaints—SRA 2011 regime and SRA 2019 regime compared [Archived] ARCHIVED: This archived Practice Note contrasts the requirements in the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s (SRA’s) 2011 and 2019 regimes as well as wider requirements in relation to complaints. There is a separate Practice Note providing more detailed guidance on the SRA’s 2019 complaints requirements—see Practice Note: Complaints—law firms. Regulatory requirements in relation to complaints are contained in various places, including the 2019 Codes, the SRA Financial Services (Conduct of Business) Rules, the SRA Transparency Rules and the SRA Indemnity Rules. Applicable requirements also stem from the Legal Services Board (LSB). These are summarised in the Legal Ombudsman (LeO) Scheme Rules. SRA requirements in the 2019 Codes in relation to complaints specifically apply only when you are providing services to the public or a section of the public. The requirements in the 2019 Codes represent the bare bones of those in the 2011 Code. You will see in the tables below, however, that the pared-down requirements in the 2019 Codes...

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Tax evasion facilitation—post-training assessment questions

Tax evasion facilitation—post-training assessment questions How to use this test These questions are designed to test your understanding after your attendance at our training on avoiding tax evasion facilitation. After you have completed this test, please return it to [insert name]. General Name of person completing test [Insert name] Role [Insert role] Date [Insert date] Multiple choice questions Circle the correct answer. Question Multiple choice answers 1. Under which Act would [insert organisation name] commit an offence if it fails to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion? (a) Criminal Finances Act 2017(b) Serious Crime Act 2015(c) Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 2. What is not an element of the tax evasion facilitation offence? (a) Criminal tax evasion by a tax payer(b) Failure by [insert organisation name] to prevent our employee/agent from criminally facilitating tax evasion(c) Offering a bribe 3. Who is liable if the offence of failing to prevent tax evasion facilitation is committed? (a) an individual (ie an employee or agent of [insert organisation name](b) [insert...

Rejecting or terminating an agent or intermediary relationship—suggested wording

Rejecting or terminating an agent or intermediary relationship—suggested wording As we can be held liable for [ bribery OR facilitation of tax evasion OR [insert relevant crime]] committed by an agent or intermediary while acting on our behalf, we must be confident before retaining an agent or intermediary (as well as throughout the business relationship) that they will not engage in [insert details of relevant crime, eg bribery]. Therefore, our [anti-bribery and corruption OR prevention of tax evasion facilitation OR [insert relevant crime]] measures require us to conduct [ongoing] due diligence in relation to any third parties [acting on OR proposing to act] our behalf, to ensure any risks of [insert relevant crime, eg bribery and corruption] are identified and managed. Unfortunately, our [ongoing] due diligence process in relation to our [proposed] arrangement with you has revealed [insert details of concerns revealed by your due diligence process]. [We have raised our concerns with [name individual] and suggested the following actions be...

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Am I allowed to pay or receive a commission under anti-bribery legislation?

Am I allowed to pay or receive a commission under anti-bribery legislation? Please note, this Q&A only considers UK bribery legislation. Payment of commissions We refer you to Practice Note: How to identify when a commission might become a bribe, which outlines how all commissions constitute the giving of a financial advantage, although they will not necessarily be bribes. The Bribery Act 2010 (BA 2010) has a broad interpretation of what may constitute a bribe. It is described as a 'financial or other advantage' given or received in a business context, which constitutes or induces the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. Performance will be ‘improper’ if it breaches a relevant expectation of good faith or impartiality. The general offences under the BA 2010 therefore will often capture the payment of commission, though this will vary among industry. For example, in the art market, a common practice has been the payment of commission to intermediaries owing a duty of trust to an art collector in...

In a lease extension of an underlease pursuant to the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 (LRHUDA 1993), a freeholder is the competent landlord. There is an intermediary landlord under a headlease. The lease extension will extend beyond the headlease. The headlease provides for the freeholder to insure and reinstate the building. The underlease provides that the intermediary landlord will enforce these covenants. The freeholder does not want to give a direct future covenant itself. When the headlease falls away, will an obligation be implied on the landlord to insure and repair the building vis a vis undertenants or what steps can be taken to ensure that the extended underlease has right to require the freeholder to insure and repair? Does LRHUDA 1993, s 57 help?

In a lease extension of an underlease pursuant to the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 (LRHUDA 1993), a freeholder is the competent landlord. There is an intermediary landlord under a headlease. The lease extension will extend beyond the headlease. The headlease provides for the freeholder to insure and reinstate the building. The underlease provides that the intermediary landlord will enforce these covenants. The freeholder does not want to give a direct future covenant itself. When the headlease falls away, will an obligation be implied on the landlord to insure and repair the building vis a vis undertenants or what steps can be taken to ensure that the extended underlease has right to require the freeholder to insure and repair? Does LRHUDA 1993, s 57 help? In this scenario, a difficulty arises as the headlease is shorter than the extended underlease, but the covenants requiring the freeholder to insure and reinstate the building are contained in the headlease and are, therefore, contractual obligations between the freeholder and the...

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Risk & Compliance weekly highlights—14 November 2024

This week's edition of Risk & Compliance weekly highlights includes: the releasing of a report highlighting the data protection concerns arising from the use of genomics by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), the latest financial sanctions, the publication of the November 2024 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) reporter booklet by the UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) and EU due-diligence reporting duties to be simplified with an ‘omnibus’ regulation.

Practice Compliance weekly highlights—14 November 2024

This week's edition of Practice Compliance weekly highlights includes: the latest financial sanctions, the publication of the November 2024 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) reporter booklet by the UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) and the releasing of a report highlighting the data protection concerns arising from the use of genomics by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).

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141 Subsidiary acting as authorised dealer in securities

(1)     The prohibition in section 136 (prohibition on subsidiary being a member of its holding company) does not apply where the shares are held by the subsidiary in the ordinary course of its business as an intermediary.(2)     For this purpose a person is an intermediary if he—(a)     carries on a bona fide business of dealing in securities,(b)     is a member of or has access to a [UK regulated market], and(c)     does not carry on an excluded business.(3)     The following are excluded businesses—(a)     a business